



ANNEX No. 1
CONCERNING THE COMPOSITION OF THE G3 GROUP
ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENT OF SECURITY (DAS)

The Administrative Department of Security (DAS by its initials in the Spanish language) carries out multiple functions, including the following: producing the official intelligence required by the national government; formulating administrative policies on intelligence to guarantee internal and external national security for the Colombian State; obtaining and processing domestic and foreign information on issues relating to national security with the purpose of producing official intelligence to aid the President of the Republic in policy- and decision-making. These activities, along with others, are directed by the Executive Intelligence Office through the Intelligence Analysis Office.¹

Additionally, the Director del DAS has the function of implementing the agenda required by the President of the Republic with respect to national security, official intelligence, and strategic operations in order to be able to carry out its plan for government.² Furthermore, the Administrative Department of Security, DAS, directly depends on the President of the Republic for its administration.

The director of the DAS also has the power to create permanent or temporary work groups,³ which according to regulations should be created through an administrative act that determines the tasks to be carried out and the consequent responsibilities. Nonetheless, in violation to these legal provisions, the DAS created the Special Intelligence Group known as G-3. Even though it was established without any administrative act, it was known to the General Director of the DAS, senior advisors, intelligence and operations directors, deputy operations and counter-intelligence directors, as demonstrated by the minutes to meeting No. 001 in March 2005.

According to the investigations carried out by the Prosecutor General's Office (*Fiscalía General de la Nación*), this G-3 special group operated from 2004 to 2006 and was established with the specific purpose of carrying out offensive intelligence tasks against so called "*opposition to the government*". The targets included the José Alvear Restrepo Lawyers' Collective, the journalist Hollman Morris Rincón, the journalist Carlos Arturo Lozano Guillen, the Colombian Commission of Jurists, the politician Carlos Gaviria Díaz, senator Gustavo Petro, and representative Wilson Borja, among many others.

The tasks carried out by the G-3 Special Intelligence Office was known to the general directors of the DAS, who participated in the internal meetings for this work group and collaborated in

1 Resolution 01278 of 2004.

2 Decree 643 of 2004.

3 Article 15 of Law 489 of 1998.



designing strategies to fulfil the objectives. The results to the offensive intelligence operations have been made public by Mr. CARLOS ALBERTO ARZAYUS, deputy director of operations and Mr. JAIME FERNANDO OVALLE OLAZ, head of the G-3 Special Group.

Even if the DAS, as an official intelligence agency, has the power to gather necessary information and undertake intelligence activities to maintain national security, it should also act with respect to human rights and constitutional guarantees.⁴ The intelligence activities carried out by the G-3 group were openly illegal and therefore do not only affect constitutional guarantees and rights of persons and social and opposition organisations, rather they were implemented without any court order and allegedly were responsible for death threats, sabotage and harassment against the persons and organisations that were the objects of its persecution.

According to information provided on June 9, 2009, during a plenary debate in the Senate, the composition of this group included the following:⁵

The operational G-3 team was made up of JAIME FERNANDO OVALLE OLAZ, G-3 coordinator (chief of operations), JUAN CARLOS SASTOQUE (retired), ASTRID FERNANDA CANTOR VARELA (intelligence assistant), RONALD HERVEY RIVERA (detective), DEYSI CAROLINA CANCINO ARDILA (detective), and YULI PAULIN QUINTERO CEPEDA (detective), among others.

The G-3 operations team designed tasks concerning surveillance, interceptions, wiretapping, and offensive operations. The strategic policies for these illegal activities were laid out for 2004, 2005 and 2006 (as far as is known). This group met on a regular basis to design policies for surveillance, interceptions and intelligence operations against persons and social organisations. The members of the board were the following:

1. **JORGE AURELIO NOGUERA COTES.**⁶ He was appointed the director of the DAS on August 16, 2002, and held the post until October 25, 2005, when President Álvaro Uribe Vélez

⁴ Article 40 of Decree 643.

⁵ Address by Senator Gustavo Petro during a Senate plenary debate concerning the DAS on June 9, 2009, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cv7RXcIoMws&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.dhcolombia.info%2Fspip.php%3Farticle776&feature=player_embedded.

⁶ Previously, Jorge Noguera Cotes had posts as the general secretary for the Magdalena Regional Autonomous Corporation, *Corpamag*, the secretary of Comprehensive Administrative Management and advisor to the governor of Magdalena in 1999 and 2000. Mr. Noguera Cotes worked as the general secretary of the Santa Marta Regional Port Authority and as senior advisor to *Puertos de Colombia*. He was also the manager and head of legal affairs at the Santa Marta Maritime Terminal and the secretary general for the Santa Marta Municipal Welfare Fund. He has been the legal and administrative advisor for several financial institutions, including Davivienda, Concasa, Credencial-Banco de Occidente and Granahorrar (Department of Magdalena) and also for the governor's office of this department and the Santa Marta city government. Jorge Noguera Cotes was also the general manager for Álvaro Uribe Vélez's first presidential campaign in the department of



accepted his resignation. Noguera Cotes is one of the persons most responsible for this illegal surveillance. Presently, he is under detention and is being criminally investigated for his ties with paramilitarism, especially Rodrigo Tovar Pupo, aka Jorge 40, chief of the Northern Bloc of the paramilitary structures. Noguera Cotes has been called to trial⁷ for the homicides of trade unionists, human rights defenders, and politicians speaking out against the pact between paramilitarism and the Colombian political elite, including human rights defender Alfredo Correa D'Andreis, the trade unionists Zully Esther Condina and Adán Pacheco, and the politician Fernando Piscioti Van Strahlen. Furthermore, he has been charged with erasing intelligence archives on paramilitary bosses and drug traffickers and putting to Das to the service of paramilitarism.

2. **JOSE MIGUEL NARVAEZ MARTINEZ.** Senior advisor to then director Jorge Noguera Cotes. As part of his testimony provided before the Justice and Peace legal proceedings, the paramilitary Ivan Laverde Zapata, aka El Iguano,⁸ asserted Narváez belonged to the Group of Six.

According to the book *"My Confession,"* written by the paramilitary leader Carlos Castaño Gil, José Miguel Narváez belonged to this Group of Six and was one of the persons most responsible politically and intellectually for paramilitarism in Colombia. According to Castaño Gil, Mr. Narváez was a patriot and ideological leader for paramilitaries and indicated which public figures should be murdered. Furthermore, El Iguano implicated Narváez in the kidnapping of then representative Piedad Córdoba in May 1999. As part of their testimony provided before the Justice and Peace legal proceedings, four paramilitary chiefs alleged Narváez was the intellectual author of the murder of the journalist and humorist JAIME GARZON. The paramilitary chief Éver Veloza García, aka HH, provided testimony alleging José Miguel Narváez gave courses on why it was *"licit to kill communists in Colombia"* and was one of the most senior ideological advisors and educators for the Colombian State military and intelligence schools. Moreover, General Rito Alejo del Rio, was his student when Narváez advised him in Urabá (Department of Antioquia). Presently, the

Magdalena. After he resigned as director of the DAS, he was appointed consul in Milan, a post he held until 2006.

⁷ On May 6, 2009, Noguera Cotes was formally charged with *Aggravated Conspiracy to Commit a Crime, Aggravated Homicide* of human rights defender Alfredo Correa D'Andreis, trade unionists Ms. Zully Esther Condina and Adán Pacheco, and the politician Fernando Piscioti Van Strahlen, *Improper Use of Classified or Secret Information, Destruction, Suppression or Concealment of Public Document, Abuse of Authority by both Arbitrary and Unjust Act, and Misappropriation and Bribery.*

⁸ El Iguano was the right-hand to paramilitary chief Salvatore Mancuso Gómez in the department of Norte de Santander. As part of his testimony provided before the Justice and Peace legal proceedings, he has confessed to carrying out more than 300 murders.



former general Rito Alejo del Río is under detention and criminally prosecuted for his ties to paramilitarism when he was the commander of the XVII Brigade in Urabá (Department of Antioquia) and for his responsibility in crimes against humanity committed against these populations, especially the Peace Community of San José de Apartadó.

Mr. Narváez Martínez has occupied the following posts:

- Advisor on intelligence security affairs for the XIII Brigade in 2002.
 - Advisor to the Minister of Defence during the Andrés Pastrana administration, which he continued during the Álvaro Uribe Vélez administration. It is known Pedro Juan Moreno⁹ recommended him to be director of national intelligence, though the nomination was thwarted during the first Uribe Vélez administration.
 - In 2002, he was appointed external senior advisor of the DAS and participated as such in the creation of the G-3 intelligence group.
 - In June 2005, then director of DAS Noguera Cotes appointed him national deputy director of the DAS, though he was forced to resign due to the scandals faced by Noguera Cotes.
3. **ENRIQUE ABERTO ARIZA RIVAS.** General Director of Intelligence.

⁹ According to the Colombian magazine *Semana*, Pedro Juan Moreno was a Conservative Party leader from the department of Antioquia. He was a Medellín city council member in 1986, latter was a departmental assembly member, and in 1990 was a representative to the national congress. He also participated in Álvaro Uribe Vélez's campaign for governor of Antioquia, who once elected appointed Moreno to be secretary of the departmental government. He aided Uribe in establishing the controversial security cooperatives, *Convivir*, and then supported general Rito Alejo del Río in driving guerrilla groups from Urabá. Pedro Juan Moreno was one of the most controversial figures in the Uribe administration. First, he was his closest confidant and later his most disillusioned friend. As the managing editor of his magazine *La Otra Verdad*, Pedro Juan Moreno became famous for speaking out against powerful public figures, which brought down general Leonardo Gallego, police commander in Medellín. Furthermore, Moreno soured Fabio Echeverri Correa's days at the presidential Palace of Nariño, perhaps one of Álvaro Uribe's most powerful advisors. He was the protagonist behind several conflicts and scandals affecting former Minister of Defence Martha Lucía Ramírez. He died in a helicopter accident on February 24, 2006. As part of his testimony provided before the Justice and Peace proceedings after his extradition to the United States, Salvatore Mancuso Gómez asserted Pedro Juan Moreno knew of the massacre at El Aro, which occurred in October 1997, where 15 persons were murdered by paramilitary structures in the municipality of Ituango (Department of Antioquia). (See: *Muere Pedro Juan Moreno*. *Semana Magazine*, February 24 de 2006, http://www.semana.com/wf_InfoArticulo.aspx?idArt=92862).



4. **JAQUELINE SANDOVAL SALAZAR.** General Operations Director of the Das in March 2005. Later, she was regional director in the department of Boyacá and then was appointed regional director in the department of Antioquia until 2008.
5. **CARLOS ALBERTO ARZAYUS GUERRERO.** Deputy Operations Director. He belonged to the DAS for six years. In October 2004, he received a medal from President Uribe Vélez for his excellent work in the field of security, as recommended by Jorge Noguera Cotes.

Furthermore, he has held the following positions:

- Deputy operations director of the DAS in March 2005.
 - Director of Intelligence in 2006.
 - He had knowledge of the interceptions by the DAS during the electoral campaign of 2006. At the time then director of the DAS ANDRES PEÑATE alleged he was responsible for these acts, since the interception equipment was under his control.
 - Later, he held several positions at the Prosecutor General's Office. First, he was the national coordinator of the Technical Investigation Unit (CTI by its initials in the Spanish language) of the Prosecutor General's Office. Later, he was the director of CTI in December 2007. At the time, before the Senate's First Commission, senator Gustavo Petro claimed ARZAYUS GUERRERO attempted to establish a unit within the CTI to centralise all of the investigations concerning members of congress for their alleged ties with paramilitarism. Mr. ARZAYUS wanted this unit to filter all the information provided by the CTI investigators for the investigations undertaken by the Supreme Court of Justice. The denunciations by Senator Gustavo Petro brought about the dismantlement of this unit's activities. In May 2009, he left the Prosecutor General's Office.
6. **MIGUEL ALFONSO LADINO.** Deputy Director of Intelligence.

The DAS agent **EMIRO ROJAS GRANADOS**, who belonged to the institution for more than 3 years, has also been implicated in these irregular acts. He held posts from detective to management. He was the regional director of the DAS in Antioquia from 1997 (when Álvaro Uribe Vélez was the governor of the department) until 2002. As the regional director of the DAS in Antioquia, he was accused of instigating baseless prosecutions against two persons who were accused of being the material authors to the murder of Jaime Garzón. In December 2005, he was appointed a member of the Truth Commission established to inquire into DAS activities relating to the accusations against Jorge Noguera Cotes. Presently, he is the Director of the DAS training school. He has never been investigated for the baseless prosecutions in the case of Jaime Garzón.

It has been established that the G-3 group had the collaboration of other DAS units and agents, which has been demonstrated in the memorandums issued from regional and national offices and



in the analysis of the notes to multiple documents. Information pertaining to the intelligence operations are archived in 104 500-page AZ folders. A significant part of the illegal information concerns surveillance, illegal wiretapping, and clandestine operations against the José Alvear Restrepo Lawyers' Collective, the operation for which was baptised Operation Transmilenio. Lastly, it was established that in January 2009 DAS agents removed portable computers, boxes, and other elements supposedly containing information relating to the undercover operations. Presently, the whereabouts and the possible uses of these elements are unknown.

Furthermore, the G-3 Group was made up of the National and International Observation and Verification Group (**GONI** Group by its initials in the Spanish language), which had the objective of carrying out surveillance on the magistrates of the Supreme Court of Justice.

The following annex presents the principal activities carried out against members of CAJAR by the G-3 group.

ANNEX No. 2
CONCERNING THE OFFENSIVE INTELLIGENCE ACTIONS CARRIED OUT AGAINST MEMBERS OF CAJAR
BY THE G-3 GROUP

The principal offensive intelligence activities carried out by this group against members of the José Alvear Restrepo Lawyers' Collective include the following:

1. The José Alvear Restrepo Lawyers' Collective was registered, identified, reviewed and examined.
 - Registration before the Chamber of Commerce
 - Identification of its sources of financial cooperation
 - Identification of the different projects undertaken
 - Bank Accounts
 - Currency exchange transactions
 - Financial reports
 - Determination of the institution's assets



- Photographic and video documentation of the main office and building where CAJAR operates
- 2. Landlines, mobile telephones, fax communication and electronic mail was intercepted.
- 3. Orders were issued to obtain copies of the books and documents published by CAJAR.
- 4. Reintegrated combatants were interviewed with the purpose of implicating CAJAR with illegal armed groups.
- 5. Meetings were held with the purpose of examining ways to criminally prosecute CAJAR members.
- 6. The principal cases of human rights violations represented by CAJAR before national and international organisms were identified.
- 7. An organisational chart of CAJAR was drafted with photographs indicating the intelligence agents responsible for each CAJAR member.
- 8. Orders were given to carry out offensive actions to sabotage or hinder human rights activities. For instance, the DAS impeded an agreement from being signed between Inravisión and CAJAR to broadcast human rights programs. The DAS also thwarted international work trips as in the case of the lawyer to the Hague, Netherlands.
- 9. Orders were issued to infiltrate persons to the service of the DAS within CAJAR.
- 10. Orders were issued to “recruit” CAJAR drivers as DAS informants.
- 11. Intelligence reports were produced indicating the DAS had informants with “*direct access to the targets*”, which presumes the presence infiltrated persons within CAJAR.

A. CONCERNING CAJAR MEMBERS

- Complete biographical information was gathered.
- Work and professional history was compiled.
- Information was compiled concerning personal matters and family history.
- “*Profiles on ideological positions*” were created.
- “*Psychological profiles*” were created.
- Nuclear family was identified (parents, siblings, children, spouses, and in-laws).



- Photographs and video were taken of them and their nuclear family, including underage children.
- Assets, financial records, and bank accounts were determined and identified, as well as those of family members.
- Offices and homes were photographed and videotaped, as well as those of their family members.
- The schools and universities where their children studied were identified as well as their courses of study.
- For several months at a time, ongoing surveillance of their homes was carried out from set points. (There is at least one proven case of apartments being rented with a view of the lawyer's home.)
- There is at least one proven case of acquiring the set of keys to enter the home of one of the lawyers.
- Photographs and video were taken of the persons and vehicles that visited their homes, who were then subjected to surveillance.
- Their movements –and those of their family members- were tracked.
- Their daily routines and routes were determined.
- Information was gathered by going through the trash left by their offices and homes.
- The trips carried out by the lawyers to different parts of the country were subjected to surveillance.
- Their international travel –and in some cases that of their family- was recorded.
- Their electronic mail and landline and mobile telephones –and in some cases that of their family- were intercepted.
- Hundreds of calls and emails –and in some cases that of their family- were intercepted and recorded.
- Their principal contacts nationally and internationally were identified (personal, NGOs, aid agencies, embassies, and State and multilateral bodies, etc.).
- Activities and conferences were infiltrated to record them, even presenting themselves as journalists.
- Information was gathered on their flight itinerary, as well as the agenda of activities during national and international trips made by CAJAR members.



- Baseless accusations are made alleging ties between the lawyers and guerrilla groups.
- At least one photographic analysis was undertaken of one CAJAR member with photos of an alleged guerrilla member with the purpose of determining possible *"inadmissibility."*
- Baseless accusations are made against a lawyer as a participant in the alleged *"Bolívar's Sword"* Plan, which consisted in the Cuban and Venezuelan governments' plan to extend the Bolivarian revolution throughout Latin America.
- There is at least one proven case of orders being issued to undertake intelligence tasks in the hometowns of the lawyer to track her during her vacations.

OTHER ASPECTS:

- CAJAR activities are considered *"campaigns to delegitimise the State and the president and his policies, especially the policy of democratic security."*
- The information gathering placed emphasis on the cases or issues that implicated the president or his policies. For instance, the lawsuit against the legislative act that passed the presidential re-election, the meetings to examine the president's unsubstantiated accusations against CAJAR, the publications *THE AUTHORITARIAN SPELL* that evaluated the Uribe administration, the legal actions filed against the president, the president's initial refusal to receive Nobel Peace Laureate Shirin Ebadi, and the international denunciations, among other actions.
- International missions were subjected to surveillance. For example, the FIDH mission on human right defenders led by Nobel Peace Laureate Shirin Ebadi or the mission to the city of Valledupar undertaken by Ms. Susana Villarán and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. On both occasions, the missions were under surveillance. They were photographed and videotaped and orders were issued to carry out intelligence activities against these public figures and their committees.
- The intelligence activities paid special attention to CAJAR's international work, litigation and contacts.
- The intelligence activities the DAS carried out against CAJAR used information from the Official Human Rights Defenders Protection Program, including the lawyers' measures of protection, intercepting two-way radios, orders to recruit CAJAR's drivers, among other actions.
- The intelligence activities carried out by the DAS perfectly coincide with many acts of harassment, surveillance, threats and other attacks suffered by the members of CAJAR, including the case of the dismembered doll sent with a threat to the daughter



and family of CAJAR's president, the proven surveillance of the lawyers, the appearance of print advertisements relating to CAJAR, electronic information theft, sabotaging the partnership with Inravisión, sabotaging a lawyer's trip to The Hague, and surveillance and tracking, among other acts.

- These acts concern an evident persecution carried out against human rights organisations and their members due to their activity in the defence of human rights. The persecution concentrated on issues relating to human rights in general. For instance, orders were issued to obtain all CAJAR publications, to identify the Bogotá council members who voted in favour of city schools incorporating a human rights curriculum, and to carry out an operation against a teacher so she would be removed from a school for propagating "*subversive ideology*" merely because she presented certain critical texts.
- The order to create an environmental NGO to supposedly try to infiltrate other NGOs.
- Significant resources were spent in the persecution carried out against CAJAR as part of OPERATION TRANSMILENIO, which were obtained from the budget heading RESERVED EXPENSES (including the rent for set observation points, payment to informants, ongoing intelligence activities, and communications, among other costs).
- The DAS recommended establishing an official policy to keep NGOs from reporting "*unproven*" human rights violations that implicated public servants.

Bogotá, Colombia

June 25, 2009